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Abstract 
Belief and legal philosophy: a conceptual framework for 
Christian scholarship in undergraduate legal education  
Legal education in South Africa has arrived at a discursive 
juncture that demands clarity on what the “purpose” of legal 
education should be. Debate on the purpose of legal education, 
more specifically for the Christian law student, becomes 
especially important in a society dominated by positivism, mate-
rialism and pragmatism. With specific reference to the under-
graduate Christian law student, this article firstly explains that 
the purpose of legal education should include the nurturing of 
the student’s belief – a belief encompassing his/her foun-
dational perspective(s) on reality. Secondly, in order to achieve 
the proper nurturing and development of the Christian law 
student’s belief, the importance of the teaching of legal philo-
sophy is explained. In this regard, proposals are postulated 
pertaining to specific means by which such nurturing and 
development of the undergraduate Christian law student’s 
foundational belief can be attained. 
Opsomming 
Geloof en regsfilosofie: ’n begripsmatige raamwerk vir 
Christelike vakkundigheid in voorgraadse regsopleiding  
Regsopleiding in Suid-Afrika het by ’n diskursiewe tydstip ge-
kom wat duidelikheid vereis oor wat die “doel” van regsop-
leiding behoort te wees. Debat oor die doel van regsopleiding, 
meer spesifiek vir die Christen-regstudent, word veral belangrik 
in ’n nuwe samelewing wat oorheers word deur positivisme, 
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materialisme en pragmatisme. Met spesifieke verwysing na die 
voorgraadse Christen-regstudent, maak hierdie artikel dit eers-
tens duidelik dat die doel van regsopleiding die koestering van 
die student se geloof behoort in te sluit – geloof wat sy/haar 
grondliggende perspektief(we) oor die werklikheid omvat. 
Tweedens, ten einde die behoorlike koestering en ontwikkeling 
van die Christen-regstudent se geloof moontlik te maak, word 
die belangrikheid van die onderrig van regsfilosofie duidelik ge-
maak. In hierdie verband word voorstelle wat spesifiek verband 
hou met maniere waarop sodanige koestering en ontwikkeling 
van die voorgraadse Christen-regstudent se grondliggende 
geloof bereik kan word, gepostuleer. 
1. Introduction 
These are challenging times for higher education in South Africa, 
where critical discussion on the purpose of higher education is espe-
cially relevant to legal education.1 There is an overwhelming affilia-
tion towards three essential requirements of the practitioner, namely 
a basic knowledge of the law and where to find it; an understanding 
of the relationship of law to the social and economic environment in 
which it operates; and the ability to handle facts and to apply ab-
stract concepts to those facts (cf. Barnett, 1995:108). What have 
also been observed are two vital aspects that debate on legal edu-
cation views as its purpose; these are the teaching of the knowledge 
of where to look for the answer, and the cultivation of the ability to 
define the problem in order to seek the answer.2 These approaches 
imply the expectation that legal education needs to assist in the 
attainment of such requirements, and consequently this is where the 
contemporary emphasis is placed in such education. Although im-
portant, these popular insights limit legal education to an over-
whelmingly skills-based and pragmatic approach in which the posi-
tive law (or the “written” law of the day) forms the main point of 
reference, irrespective of the nature of its content. This overwhelm-
ingly positivistic tendency is further fueled by the dictates and 
attractions of market forces and the popular perception of the law as 
                                      
1 Included in such discussion are issues related to theory versus practice; new 
teaching and assessment methods; transformation in academia; the prior-
itisation of the natural sciences over other sectors of scholarship; pretertiary 
education as preparation for tertiary education; and the responsibilities of 
scholarship towards civic engagement (such as socio-economic development). 
2 This is an observation by Martin (1995:45) regarding the position in America. 
However, the same can be said of the South African context.  
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“solo-science”.3 In addition, contemporary liberal and pluralist so-
ciety generally views religion as a private affair, and this is clearly 
witnessed within the halls of legal education in South Africa.4 As a 
result the Christian law graduate enters the legal profession with a 
mind that might be well versed in “the law” (irrespective of what it 
may be), but bearing the risk of a legal mind far removed from its 
Christian foundations. All of this culminates in a negation of the 
foundational “belief” aspect of the Christian law student. The con-
sequences are especially of concern, bearing in mind that brain 
development occurs in the late teens and early twenties, during 
which the frontal lobes and sub-cortical areas of the brain mature. 
These areas are associated respectively with abstract thought and 
with memory, attention and emotional control. Therefore students 
are, according to Bohlin (2005:102-103), at a particularly impres-
sionable stage in their lives.  
Consequently, this article firstly explains that the purpose of legal 
education should include the nurturing and development of the un-
dergraduate Christian law student’s belief dimension, which encom-
passes his/her foundational perspective(s) on reality. This includes 
the unveiling of the author’s (SdF) own experiences in academia as 
a result of which it became clear that there is a void in terms of the 
integration of the Christian belief in the teaching of the law in South 
Africa, this especially when a substantial number of students are 
Christian. An analysis also indicates the importance of addressing 
the “deeper” issues related to legal education such as what should 
be regarded as good in life, which consequently leads to the need to 
address the concept of belief or foundational worldview in the 
education of the undergraduate Christian law student. In this regard, 
a proposed and universal meaning is ascribed to belief and applied 
to the Christian context. Secondly, in order to remedy the situation 
                                      
3 Berman (1983:vii) observes that today people think of law primarily as the mass 
of legislative, administrative and judicial rules, procedures, and techniques 
applied in a given country. In contrast to this, one needs to take note of the 
Blackstonian approach in which natural law, divine law, the law of nations, 
English common law, local customary law, Roman law, ecclesiastical law, the 
law merchant, statutory law, and equity were intertwined with one another. In 
this, Berman (1983) is in support of the omnipresence of the law – the 
multiplicity of inextricable attachments the law has with the various sciences. 
4 In fact, this is a result of a more general “anti-religious” sentiment in 
contemporary liberal democracies. For an apt argument confirming this (for the 
South African context as well) although pertaining specifically to the American 
context, see Carter (1993).  
Belief and legal philosophy: a conceptual framework for Christian scholarship ...  
46   Koers 74(1 & 2) 2009:43-65 
described in the first part of this article, the importance of the 
teaching of legal philosophy is conceptually analysed and argued 
for, and more specifically, proposals are made pertaining to ways in 
which the teaching of legal philosophy at undergraduate level can be 
made not only more effective, but also more balanced, objective, 
and inclusive in its approach. This also has advantages for non-
Christian law students.  
It is important to note, however, that although the educative task in 
matters of belief is the responsibility of many sectors within society, 
for example the family, the school and the church, this article looks 
specifically at the educative task of the law faculty as an entity within 
higher education which also carries the civic responsibility of nur-
turing the belief aspect of the Christian law student. This does not 
imply an emphasis on the Christian law student to the exclusion of 
other students holding non-Christian beliefs. This article concen-
trates on Christian law students (at undergraduate level) precisely 
because of the over-emphasis of positivism, indulgence in material-
ism and the privatisation of religion5 (as stated earlier) by contem-
porary society, including legal education, in South Africa and in 
many other liberal and pluralist states. To give effect to plurality, one 
also has to represent this a plurality, and in this regard Stuntz 
(2003:1708) succinctly states:  
Bringing Christianity to bear on legal theory, as one of many 
perspectives in this age that exalts diversity, would be a good 
way to make legal theory for our pluralist society more pluralist. 
That might in turn allow our law to better represent the society it 
serves. 
This observation is most applicable for the South African context, in 
which Christianity is substantially reflected.  
2. Belief and the educative task 
2.1 Background 
Lecturing Introduction to legal philosophy to undergraduate final 
year law students produces valuable insights. Providing students 
with an abstract and ideology laden section of the law, brings about 
a certain optimism and curiosity that connects with their innermost 
                                      
5 Religion is understood here in the traditional sense, for example, the main-
stream traditional religions such as Christianity, Judaism and Islam.  
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being. Students learn to understand the different shades of right and 
wrong, and learn about values and the origins of values. They 
realise that it is acceptable to be affiliated with a specific founda-
tional belief when it comes to distinguishing between right and 
wrong – a belief that is not necessarily anchored in the lecturer, the 
faculty and/or the university. These students tend to play open cards 
when dealing with legal philosophically-inclined themes such as the 
interpretation of human rights, the weight of natural law (as opposed 
to the contemporary over-emphasis on positivism), the relationship 
between the law, morality and religion, the myth of neutrality, and 
the meanings and purposes of justice. Students also eagerly part-
icipate in and consider “ultimate” topics, which are sometimes ac-
companied by an internal conflict arising from what the student 
believes to be right or wrong, and what he/she is taught to be right 
or wrong in law school. In two recent class surveys (spanning a 
period of two consecutive years) conducted with the final year 
students in legal philosophy, 78% commented (anonymously) that 
the Christian God is their axiomatic point of departure in distinguish-
ing right from wrong. However, whether South African faculties of 
law accommodate a Christian context in legal education is strongly 
doubted.6 This is being confirmed by, among others (and as men-
tioned before), commercial and material interests, a society which is 
sceptical of moral absolutes, Western society’s emphasis on 
religious neutrality, the privatisation of religion, and a predominant 
emphasis on pragmatic and utilitarian goals in higher education.  
Henderson’s (2003:48, 51) observation therefore makes sense re-
garding the many who leave law school disillusioned, perceiving the 
law as a value-neutral instrument and lawyers as persons who wield 
that instrument without regard to its impact on society. According to 
Henderson (2003:49), criticisms of legal education demonstrate that 
today’s law students perceive legal education as alienating them 
from their values and ideals. What is witnessed in the above is 
surely contrary to the view that education should enhance and de-
velop the student’s personal values, interests and evaluations of 
what counts as good in life (Valenkamp & Van der Walt, 2006:9; 
also see Higgs, 1991:165). Hauerwas (2007) rightly states that any 
knowledge worth having cannot help but shape who we are and 
accordingly our understanding of the world. Hauerwas therefore 
prefers referring to “moral formation” instead of “education” (Hauer-
                                      
6 Implied is the expectation of accommodating Christian education due to the 
prevalence of Christianity in South Africa. 
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was, 2007:46). In this regard, MacIntyre states (quoted in Hauerwas, 
2007:131):  
Insofar as education has a moral import, it is not in and through 
the teaching of morality or values or religion or anything else as 
a separate and additional set of subjects; it is rather that there 
is a moral import in the whole structure of education, in 
everything that we teach, and that morality is not primarily about 
constraints upon how we pursue the various goals which we 
pursue, it is primarily about the nature of these goals them-
selves. 7  
Bearing this in mind, education should include the enhancement and 
nurturing of the foundational belief aspect of the student, including 
the Christian law student. Morality, personal values, and that which 
counts as good in life are all inextricably connected to one’s foun-
dational belief system. What must then be understood by a founda-
tional belief?  
There are many interpretations of what should be understood re-
garding belief from a foundational angle. However, for the purposes 
of this article, belief refers to a loyalty to something or other as 
divine (divine means having the status of not depending on anything 
else; Clouser, 1991:21-22), and therefore, this divinity acts as the 
source from which all presuppositions in determining the individual’s 
worldview emanate (Hiebert & Hiebert, s.a.:14).8 Belief in this con-
text therefore has a foundational and pretheoretical (pre-scientific) 
connotation, and plays an important role in hypothesising on ulti-
mate questions of human existence “not explaining the basic forces 
of the universe but understanding why there is a universe, not how 
our bodies operate but why they do, not how they enhance the 
range of choices arrayed before us but what choices we should 
make” (cf. Carter, 1998:497).  
According to the Christian belief, the divine is God who created the 
universe and who does not form part of the universe nor is the uni-
verse part of God. Also, God created within the world an intelligible 
revelation of his relations to the universe, especially his relations to 
humans. In the words of Clouser (1991:43-44): “This body of 
teaching is the authoritative guide for all knowledge of God and the 
                                      
7 Similarly Canavan (1977:45-46) states that: “… probably all legal questions 
have a moral dimension and involve moral issues”. 
8 For further explanation on this view of religion, see Clouser (1991:1-48).  
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most important truths about humans. It includes the teaching of the 
core belief that only God is divine …” Irrespective of the deno-
minational affiliations of the Christian, the fact remains that his/her 
views on aspects and activities in reality will be influenced (or have 
the potential to be influenced) by the said core belief (to whatever 
degree). Therefore the law, as an important aspect and activity in 
reality, as well as the Christian religion, forms an inescapable part of 
the domain of foundational belief. In the spectrum of options of what 
should be right and wrong [the normative aspect presented by the 
law (and therefore legal education)], the Christian law student would 
(should) revert to the Christian foundational belief in trying to come 
to a solution regarding jurisprudential issues. In this regard, the 
Christian would refer, for example, to the Bible, commentaries on 
the Bible, teachings (written and spoken) of a specific denomination 
or church and so forth, to further clarify what his/her belief views as 
right or wrong. Therefore, belief in this regard refers to God (and his 
revelation) as part of the Christian student’s foundational belief. This 
has implications for legal education and the legal profession. 
Understanding the belief aspect, and more specifically that of Chris-
tianity, one understands Stuntz’s view that Christianity is a theory of 
everything, and everything includes the law. Stuntz (2003:1721) 
adds: 
And Christianity is different from other theories of everything, 
particularly the non-theistic theories that dominate in uni-
versities today. Among other things, Christianity holds that 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ find their definition not in men’s and women’s 
choices but in God’s character.  
Cognisance needs to be taken of the fact that not everyone be-
lieves: that same-sex marriages are right; morality and the law are 
separate; the foetus is not human; religion and the law are separate; 
the aim of the law is merely the betterment of society (without any 
further moral or religious aim); the law is aimed at pragmatic ends; 
freedom of expression qualifies trade in adult pornography; rehabi-
litation is superior to punishment in penological theorising; and in the 
unlimited validity of euthanasia. We all have views that are nurtured 
and informed by foundational beliefs, and which are not necessarily 
in agreement regarding the above issues. If these views are not pro-
perly addressed and nurtured, there could be adverse conse-
quences for the student’s intellectual, religious, and psychological 
well-being (including the conscience).  
Consequently, the proceeding section of this article deals with the 
importance of legal philosophy in assisting the nurturing and deve-
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lopment of the Christian law student’s foundational belief system, 
and provides specific proposals on how to effectively apply legal 
philosophy (and legal education in general). This also implies the 
value of legal philosophy for non-Christian law students.  
3. Proposals for the teaching of legal philosophy 
3.1 Legal philosophy 
Cotterrell (2000:179) observes that legal philosophy has a mode-
rately secure place in the undergraduate law curriculum in the 
United Kingdom, and adds that this is the situation after much con-
troversy and many local skirmishes in university law departments. In 
this regard, Cotterrell (2000:179) comments that “[i]f this is so, it is 
because it is thought to offer something important that other law 
school courses cannot or do not offer”. One might say that this un-
derstanding reflects the friction that existed in the United Kingdom 
between legal education in the empirical and pragmatic sense on 
the one hand, and legal education from a theoretical, more critical 
and philosophical angle, on the other. Some years ago, Barnett 
(1995:125) presented a very credible observation pertaining to the 
dissemination of legal philosophy in the United Kingdom, Canada 
and Australia, which confirmed that legal philosophy (albeit in its 
many guises) retains its force as an academic enterprise enjoying a 
central role in legal education. Barnett (1995:109; cf. also Penner et 
al., 2005:5) states that the relevance of legal philosophy for practice 
rests in the fact that it provides a critically challenging, reflective and 
morally evaluative perspective from which to appraise the increas-
ingly positivistic realm of law. In studies done abroad on the rele-
vance of legal philosophy, it has clearly been shown that the ma-
jority view is that legal philosophy provides intellectual diversity, has 
professional relevance, gives a broader perspective and under-
standing of law as an important social activity, and is an appropriate 
culmination of the academic study of law (Barnett, 1995:107). In the 
words of Kenealy (1950:103-104): 
We are a learned profession as well as a practical one. We 
have a responsibility in thought as well as in conduct. The legal 
system of every nation is profoundly affected by the philosophy 
which dominates the leaders of its legal profession. Justice 
cannot be administered in a vacuum, without regard to a 
fundamental philosophy of life, of law, and of government. I 
confess to little patience with the so-called ‘bread and butter’ 
lawyer who cannot see the place of philosophy in the law. It is 
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philosophy which shapes the law … It is not a question of 
keeping philosophy out of the law; that cannot be done. 
Within a subject such as legal philosophy, ideological expressions 
can naturally thrive due to the nature of legal philosophy as con-
ducive to such expressions, because of their concentration on the 
metaphysical, epistemological and ethical dimensions of the law. 
Also, the popular views of legal philosophy as the study of general 
theoretical questions about the nature of laws and legal systems, the 
relationship of law to justice as well as morality (Freeman, 1994:4), 
and the study of the law’s sources and purposes (Manie Triphathi, 
1975:6) confirm the affinity of legal philosophy to the belief aspect. 
This implicates the inclusion of Christian (and other) jurisprudential 
knowledge. In South Africa there is a clear threat to the philo-
sophical aspect of legal education (for reasons already explained), 
not to mention the scarcity of understanding part of the teaching of 
legal philosophy as the dissemination and nurturing of foundational 
beliefs, and even more so pertaining to Christian law students. In 
South Africa, legal philosophy is generally relegated to a semester 
or year subject (which is normally positioned in the latter half of the 
LL.B. course) and no more. After having surveyed the LL.B. course 
outline of eleven prominent South African law faculties, it became 
clear that nearly all teach legal philosophy for no more than two 
semesters. In a recent study of the subjects presented in the LL.B. 
curriculum, Kaburisa (2007) observes that legal philosophy ranks as 
secondary to no fewer than 26 other legal subjects. How, 
specifically, should the teaching of legal philosophy be structured in 
order to give effect to the foundational belief aspect of the Christian 
law student at undergraduate level?  
3.2 Proposals  
3.2.1 Early teaching of legal philosophy  
One must ask whether basic concepts and theories related to legal 
philosophy are taught earlier on in the LL.B. curriculum. It is essen-
tial that the Christian law student become familiar with foundational 
philosophical concepts and ideas early on in his/her undergraduate 
career, not only to establish a sturdy intellectual platform for the rest 
of the LL.B. curriculum, but also to anchor in the student the 
understanding that law and “foundational beliefs” are not separate 
from one another. It is in fact already in the first year of legal studies 
that the student is confronted and influenced by a barrage of 
subjects and ideas that could provide the impression that the law 
and Christianity (religion) are separate from one another (not to 
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mention the potential risk of having a lecturer who may be opposed 
intentionally or unintentionally, to the Christian or religious aspect). 
In the same manner, the non-Christian law student can also be 
erroneously taught that religion does not form part of the law, which 
could consequently cultivate an unnecessary antireligious sentiment 
which is not reflective of a pluralist and tolerant approach. In 
addition, the non-Christian law student will also, by being exposed to 
foundational legal philosophical concepts and postulations (including 
the belief aspect), gain in the knowledge of the law as encom-
passing more of reality than originally thought of. Some teachers of 
legal philosophy might be critical in the sense that they might view 
the teaching of legal philosophy to a first year student as potentially 
overburdening the student. However, this should not be the case, as 
legal philosophy could be taught in a more simplistic yet enriching 
format, where introductory passages on the meaning of (legal) philo-
sophy, the nature of law, the meaning of justice, the relevance of 
ideology, the neutrality principle, insights into natural law and posi-
tivism could be creatively structured to captivate the student. In this 
regard, sources used also need to be representative of the various 
mainstream ideologies or religions, with special emphasis on the 
role and contributions of the Christian religion to the development of 
jurisprudence. From a historical view, Christianity contributed much 
to the development of jurisprudential, political and ethical theory. 
Part of this teaching must include an effort to unleash the critical and 
inquisitive mind of the student, the latter to be taught that the law 
comes from certain contexts and is formed by various views and life 
perspectives – in other words emanating from and formed by va-
rious foundational beliefs. At present, the early teaching of legal 
philosophy is watered down to form part of the Introduction to the 
law module and therefore is not effectively (regarding creative 
methods), objectively (regarding main themes referred to below), or 
inclusively (regarding the inclusion of a wider spectrum of sources) 
being taught to first years (or to the more senior students) in the 
LL.B. curriculum in South Africa.  
Cognisance must be taken of the fact that law students must have a 
sufficient knowledge of law in order to appreciate its theoretical 
(philosophical) dimensions, while on the other hand, they should be 
open-minded enough to accept and adapt to the particular skills and 
modes of legal philosophical thought and not to have a built-up 
resistance to the latter (Barnett, 1995:103). Therefore, the concen-
tration of the dissemination of legal philosophy in the initial stages of 
the LL.B. curriculum must be sensitive to the risk of over-burdening 
the student before the student gains a reasonable knowledge of the 
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positive law, while simultaneously cultivating in the student an af-
finity to legal philosophy, an affinity to an open mind according to the 
dictates of a desired belief. Once this is effectively attained the 
student ought to be prepared for a more in-depth approach to the 
teaching of legal philosophy – closer to, or in the final year of study. 
Having been exposed to an earlier introductory course on legal 
philosophy would surely prepare the student (including the Christian 
law student) for a more in-depth approach to legal philosophy.  
3.2.2 The pretheoretical aspect 
The Christian law student needs to be introduced to the fact that 
each individual is inextricably connected to a foundational belief – 
the proverbial worldview. In other words, worldview as understood 
as a foundational belief (such as a specific religion, for example) in 
the sense that it is a premise taken from reality, which dominates 
man’s understanding/experiencing of reality, including the law. A 
pretheoretical point of departure (also referred to as a pre-scientific 
point of departure) is that which surpasses mere facts, that which 
surpasses what is limited to detection and confirmation by the sen-
ses, as well as that which surpasses assumptions surrounding the 
core belief or assumption. Belief understood as a loyalty to some-
thing or other as divine, is nothing other than a pretheoretical point 
of departure, albeit a foundational one. In understanding the pre-
theoretical character of norms, the Christian (and non-Christian) law 
student will realise that law and belief (or religion) are inseparable. 
The pretheoretical character of norms can be taught in many 
creative ways.  
Legal philosophy implies the study of general theoretical questions 
about the nature of laws and legal systems (Freeman, 1994:4) – that 
specialised field of the law that critically investigates the nature, truth 
and ideological aspect of the law and/or its content. Legal philo-
sophy plays an important role, not only in the development of a 
critical mind that can assimilate, structure and systematise facts 
leading to a rational and convincing argument, but also in the con-
text of experiencing the foundations and nature of the law. In turn, 
these issues are based on pretheoretical foundational belief sys-
tems. These pretheoretical foundations are reflected in, for example, 
the ABC of (legal) philosophy, namely metaphysics, epistemology 
and ethics. It is in terms of these three basic philosophical pillars 
that first contact should be made regarding the belief aspect and 
consequently the introduction of a particular belief as the underlying 
or axiomatic pretheoretical base of various jurisprudential issues. 
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The role that religion, such as the Christian religion, plays in this 
regard is neglected in contemporary legal education. 
The assistance of the pretheoretical (including foundational belief) is 
required in answering the difficult jurisprudential questions related 
to, for example, same-sex marriages, the status of the unborn, 
whether freedom of expression qualifies trade in adult pornography, 
or whether morality and the law are separate from one another. By 
emphasising the pretheoretical aspect, the Christian student will 
realise that the law and the Christian faith are inseparable. In fact, 
an emphasis on the pretheoretical aspect in legal education would 
be most valuable to all law students, Christians and non-Christians 
alike, in that the student would be made aware that the content of 
the law has a deeper, more underlying and foundational meaning 
and origin than the law understood as merely facts to memorise and 
apply. Also, the freedom to decide one’s view on the said 
contentious matters is of value to all students. 
In addition, all students need to be carefully and clearly educated in 
matters such as the distinction between facts and concepts, the 
meaning of theory, the complex nature of the law due to its pretheo-
retical and conceptual nature, and the reasons why judges differ on 
ethical issues (in the context of the pretheoretical aspect). All these 
matters, on deeper reflection, result in a clear insight as to the im-
portance of the pretheoretical jurisprudential context, and conse-
quently lay the foundation to an understanding of the foundational 
belief aspect itself. It is also here that the student can be taught the 
meaning of belief in the context of “a loyalty to something as divine”. 
This not only opens the door to the inclusion of many types of 
foundational beliefs, but also provides those who are antireligious 
with the opportunity to better understand and accept the fairness of 
also allowing traditional religions in the law curriculum. In fact, for 
the non-Christian law student to realise that he/she has some or 
other pretheoretical foundation in coming to conclusions on juris-
prudential issues is in itself enriching.  
3.2.3 Neutrality and its jurisprudential implications 
There has been much written on and confirming Western society’s 
emphasis on ideological and religious neutrality when it comes to 
debate within the public sphere (there have also been as many 
critical arguments in this regard), the latter perceived to be in co-
existence with the privatisation of religion. This view has infiltrated 
higher education as well, and has influenced, among other things, a 
proper and balanced dissemination of the law. The Christian law 
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student needs to be made aware of the myth of neutrality in the law. 
Thiessen (2007:25) observes that prominent liberal theorists such as 
Rawls and Macedo would ask students and teachers within a 
common school to adopt a kind of epistemological neutrality. This 
entailed the bracketing of their ultimate commitments, hereby 
limiting themselves to a public reasonableness, consequently being 
in support of a so-called “neutral public rationality”. However, a 
loyalty to the latter forces teachers and students to leave aside their 
most cherished beliefs in public discussions. Surely it is not 
necessary to explain the myth of neutrality when it comes to 
teaching. It would be more of a priority for purposes of this article to 
unveil the negative view levelled at critics of neutrality in that such 
criticism of neutrality paves the way for totalitarianism in the 
classroom (Kleinig, 1982:102). It seems that any criticism levelled at 
the neutrality of teaching signifies hostility as opposed to the so-
called friendliness of the secular status quo, and also that this 
approach is rather unfortunate as well as theoretically unfounded. 
What is also experienced is that students initially become confused 
when first taught about the myths of objectivity and neutrality in the 
law (in fact in all the sciences or aspects of reality). However, the 
students soon realise the value of being able to notice the myth of 
neutrality, which in turn provides them with more comfort in the 
exercise and proclamation of their own views – the student will soon 
come to realise that it is, after all, not so bad to take sides!  
Cotterrell (2000:184) touches on this by stating that the fact that 
there are no objectively right answers in legal philosophy may seem 
obvious to those who teach it, but can be deeply disturbing for 
students: “until, that is, they realise that it can be illuminating to see 
the favoured answers given in professional legal thought as limited”. 
This provides Christian law students with the prospect of realising 
that understanding the nature of law is a quest open to them using 
their own developing experience; “not a matter of seemingly finished 
knowledge, like a House of Lords decision that cannot be appealed”. 
This understanding provides a constructive challenge declaring that 
there are a plurality of perspectives on law, and that any teaching 
suggesting only a single perspective to be available is false and 
dangerous (Cotterrell, 2000:184), therefore also being of value to 
the non-Christian law student. In this regard, the non-Christian law 
student, by being properly taught regarding neutrality, can not only 
learn from this a sensitivity towards those fellow students who are, 
for example, from a Christian background, but can also come to the 
realisation that they themselves are anything but neutral. The end 
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result of this is a levelling of the playing-field, where stigmatisation 
will be limited.  
3.2.4 Inclusion of Christian sources 
It is ironic that the contemporary popularity of pluralism, which in fact 
should effectively accommodate various foundational beliefs, seems 
to have become indicative of “a new expression of the melting-pot 
ideal”, where persons from a wide variety of races and cultures are, 
according to Marsden, “welcomed into the university, but only on the 
condition that they think more or less alike” (Glenn, 2005:46). In fact, 
pluralism entails the exercise of tolerance regarding cultural and 
ideological expressions.  
The presence of strongly held differences of belief on cam-
puses should be dealt with by enforcement of rules of civility, 
not by intolerance toward and exclusion of a whole class of 
viewpoints. (Marsden, 1994:432.)  
This also means that, more specifically, the teaching of the law 
should strive towards including a fair amount of material that is 
reflective also of Christian perspectives, especially for the South 
African context. For example, the module on legal philosophy should 
not ignore the contributions by the Church Fathers and the Re-
formation to the law, more specifically to themes on constitutiona-
lism, human rights, equity and justice. It is a fact that in many 
faculties of law, students are introduced to classical contributions 
such as those of Plato and Aristotle, but what goes by unnoticed 
(whether intentionally or not) is that there are alternatives in embark-
ing on a study in legal philosophy, either from Ancient Athens, or 
from Adam and Eve, either from creationism (from whatever 
Christian view) or from evolutionism (from whatever secularist view). 
Also, students are being taught erroneously in many instances, for 
example that John Locke is the father of human rights or that the 
Enlightenment was the cradle of social contractarian thought; and 
important insights on constitutional theory that arose from the minds 
of the Reformers such as Martin Luther, John Calvin, Heinrich Bul-
linger and Johannes Althusius are absent from the teaching. Being 
one-dimensional (especially to an overwhelmingly theistic audience) 
could have dire consequences for the student’s perception of the 
religious foundations of the law, and the integration of these foun-
dations with reality. Need it be said that the inclusion of Christian 
sources also has the potential of enriching non-Christian minds, in 
the same manner that Christian minds can learn certain insights 
 S. de Freitas 
Koers 74(1 & 2) 2009:43-65  57 
from secular jurisprudence. In fact, many legal, political and moral 
values derive from religious teachings.  
3.2.5 Objectivity and inclusivity 
The question needs to be posed as to whether there is a truly 
objective and inclusive approach to the content (main themes) of 
legal philosophy, and whether the Christian student is properly intro-
duced to the subject by first being taught the importance of such a 
subject before the real content is tackled. Legal philosophy is a 
course that could easily be abused (intentionally or unintentionally) 
by a lecturer, since biased opinions on fundamental jurisprudential 
questions could be interpreted by students as the truth. Cotterrell 
(2000:181) emphasises the risks involved in the dissemination of 
legal philosophy due to the breadth and inclusiveness of the subject 
– “it (legal philosophy) is a complex intellectual patchwork”, the pro-
verbial Pandora’s box. Cotterrell (2000:181) observes that lecturers 
in legal philosophy often add their own personally prioritised themes 
to the legal philosophy module, themes that have originated from a 
“personal selection from a box full of ideas”. From a South African 
context of legal education, one is truly concerned as to whether legal 
philosophy is disseminated in an objective and balanced manner 
(regarding the main philosophic themes), not to even mention the 
accommodation of those students who are Christian regarding 
Christian views on such main philosophical themes.  
It is possible to attain a satisfactory level of objectivity and inclusivity 
in the undergraduate teaching of legal philosophy, irrespective of 
who might be in the audience, and irrespective of the ideological 
preferences of the lecturer. In this regard, and more specifically re-
lated to the substantive content of the module, themes dealing with 
positive law, natural law, neutrality, the meaning of law, objectivity, 
belief, philosophy, worldview, justice and the meanings of many 
other relevant and foundational concepts need to be dealt with, 
including Christian perspectives regarding such concepts. It is not 
only the Christian law student who may benefit from this approach, 
but also those non-Christian law students who are in many in-
stances, and unfortunately so, being exposed to a very limited spec-
trum of legal philosophy. This is without even commenting on the 
limited scope awarded to the teaching of legal philosophy in com-
parison to other legal subjects, when looking at the LL.B. curriculum 
in general (as referred to earlier on).  
It is also important to note that if philosophical sources from human-
istic, liberal and non-Christian contexts can be used to address 
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certain jurisprudential issues, then an effort can also be made to 
include Christian jurisprudential contributions. What makes secular 
sources superior to religious sources, since both share the concept 
of foundational belief? Not only does the law have a substantial 
Biblical background, but the depth and richness of legal philo-
sophical works by, for example, St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and 
modern-day Christian philosophers have the potential of providing 
any student with important insights into legal issues and the 
relationship between the law and the rest of reality.  
3.2.6 Electives, programmes and existing subjects 
Faculties of Law should consider the inclusion of legal modules 
which are aimed at a specific foundational belief (or religion) – in this 
regard, the Christian faith. This would naturally depend on the per-
centage of representation of Christian law students at a given uni-
versity. The introduction of electives in this regard is linked to the 
importance of teaching the essentials of legal philosophy in the first 
year (as discussed above), in that this will have influenced and 
prepared the Christian student regarding the importance of such an 
elective once he/she reaches the third or fourth year of legal studies. 
Such an elective will then have a more intense approach to the 
subject of legal philosophy with a substantial Christian dimension, 
also including other ideological perspectives which can be enriching 
both to the Christian and non-Christian law student. Although the 
availability of the necessary expertise, especially from a Christian 
point of view, might pose challenges, one must realise that there are 
many universities that have a substantial student and scholarly 
representation of the Christian faith, and law faculties should do a 
proper study in order to determine the demand in this regard. There 
can also be programmes which do not formally form part of the LL.B. 
course. A good example of this is the recent establishment of the 
Christian Legal Scholarship Programme for Southern Africa by the 
Christian Lawyers Association (CLA) (an affiliate of Advocates Inter-
national, the international organisation of Christian lawyers). The 
CLA recognises that balanced Christian input from the legal profes-
sion is imperative for nation building and the alleviating of suffering 
in South Africa. Among its other ministries, the organisation seeks to 
engage law students in Christian and ethical thinking as an im-
portant step in empowering them to fulfil their calling in whatever 
sphere of the legal arena they find themselves once they complete 
their training. The said programme is a teaching course for highly 
motivated and committed law students. It is presented by foreign 
and local legal experts who lecture, from a Christian point of view, 
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on topics related to the foundational aspects pertaining to the law, 
the interplay between worldview and the law, legal philosophy and 
application, the legal profession, as well as freedom of religion and 
the South African Constitution. The CLA presents this programme in 
collaboration with the University of the Free State. Another proposal 
would be to have Christian legal scholars visit and teach Christian 
law students at the various law faculties in South Africa.  
Academics as well as members of the various churches and civil so-
ciety should provide initiatives to address and apply the above 
proposals, of which the Christian Scholarship Programme is a good 
example. Individual initiatives might find the surrounding environ-
ment threatening and it is therefore necessary to establish networks 
where collectivities or structures are established in order to take 
Christian representation in legal education further. Steps are also to 
be taken by the said structures regarding credible evaluations in 
order to determine the needs of Christian law students at South 
African institutions of higher education. Higher education should 
formulate clear policies regarding the protection of foundational 
beliefs.9 This will not necessarily be an easy process, and the 
context of one university might differ from the context of another. 
Nevertheless, efforts will need to be made to improve the situation.  
The application of legal philosophy within various other legal sub-
jects (some will naturally be more prone than others to philosophical 
connotetions) would also be an important step towards integrating 
and accommodating the relationship between belief and the law, 
also within a Christian perspective. Here one could especially 
emphasise subjects such as legal history, human rights, constitu-
tional law, constitutional interpretation, criminal law, and criminology. 
These subjects have a strong moral element, which in turn are 
                                      
9 In this regard, policies followed by certain institutions in addressing the student’s 
values and interests are inspiring: one example being the American Association 
of Law Schools (AALS), which states that “Teachers should nurture and protect 
intellectual freedom for their students” (emphasis – SdF; Curtis, 2006:461-462). 
There is also the National Education Association (NEA) in America, which has 
specific standards by which all teachers’ conduct may be monitored and judged. 
Among other things these standards state that: “The educator, believing in the 
worth and dignity of each human being (emphasis – SdF), recognizes the 
supreme importance of the pursuit of truth” (emphasis – SdF; Curtis, 2006:473). 
Consequently, these observations emphasise the need for addressing the 
student’s affiliations to aspects related to belief (be it religion, philosophical 
opinion and/or worldview). 
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encapsulated and determined by “belief”. Stuntz (2003:1711), for 
example, states that:  
Professors encourage law school students to analyze law from 
a variety of perspectives and points of view, but religious views 
are oddly absent. A student in criminal law, for instance, is 
unlikely to question modern criminological theory from the 
standpoint of sin and redemption. If a student [did so], many 
professors would not know how to react. There would likely be 
an awkward silence, followed by a polite change of subject.10 
3.2.7 Natural law 
The overriding emphasis on substantially positivistic-inclined legal 
subjects, and the close to non-existent accommodation of know-
ledge on natural law in the LL.B. curriculum, is most disappointing. 
This reminds one of the old lawyer’s joke stated and commented 
upon by Carter (1990:481): 
If you don’t have the law on your side, argue the facts; if you 
don’t have the facts on your side, argue justice. Well, the 
scientistic approach to moral argument, and, by extension, to 
constitutional argument, is like that, too. Justice – the end-
product, if you will, of liberal theory – is treated as a second-
best (or perhaps third-best) subject of argument. Only fanatics 
make a lot of noise about morality; the smart, reflective liberal, 
however, makes an empirical case. 
Natural law theory plays an important role in limiting the over-in-
dulgence in positivism, and also in emphasising the importance of 
justice, its moral and Christian connotations and other insights re-
lated to such a concept. According to Hervada (2006:176), juridical 
science is often imbued with positivism, reduced to a positive 
science, such that the criteria of natural law play no role or at most a 
secondary role. A subject such as legal philosophy can be extended 
to accommodate themes on natural law which are most relevant to 
                                      
10 Rushdoony (1995:140-141) similarly states that criminal law is based upon 
moral principle, adding that no society can teach morality without religion, as 
well as the fact that, as a matter of history, criminal and civil law derived from 
Christian teaching. In no manner does this insinuate that a lecturer in, for 
example, criminal law, should be expected to have specialised theological 
expertise. However, this is mentioned to emphasise that the law can have 
another dimension to it, and that legal education needs to be made aware of 
this. What the solutions should be, although discussed in other sections of this 
article (albeit not exhaustively), will differ from place to place and person to 
person. 
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any Christian (and non-Christian) legal mind. In commenting upon 
Berkeley’s Jurisprudence and Social Policy programme, Messinger 
and Selznick (1985-1986:695) state the importance of philosophy 
(and history) to legal scholarship in the context of cultivating a 
concern for fundamental values, which in turn deepens the com-
mitment to justice as a governing ideal. Natural law theory has an 
integral role to play in this regard, especially when taking the values 
and principles of our South African Constitution into consideration. 
Natural law is ideally suited to the teaching of cardinal (justice, wis-
dom, courage, and temperance) and theological (faith, hope, charity) 
virtues that will make the necessary correction and proper grounding 
for character education in a pluralistic society that is principled to-
wards religion (cf. Benson, 2008:133). In this regard the Christian 
and non-Christian law student will be taught that Christianity also 
shares much with other beliefs pertaining to jurisprudential per-
spectives. A proper teaching of natural law will explain to the Chris-
tian student Christianity’s contributions to the law in general, hereby 
also informing him/her as to the interplay between belief, religion 
and the law. In this regard, Budziszewski (2006:8-9) states: 
A natural law theory is an explanation of the relations among 
goods, virtues, formal norms, and everyday moral rules … 
Natural law theories also explore such things as how we know 
the natural law, how our knowledge of it is clarified or obscured, 
and how its authority is rooted in God … Although the various 
natural law theories disagree about technical points, they all 
agree that the foundational principles of morality are right for 
everyone, that by the ordinary exercise of human reason, they 
are known to everyone, that they closely parallel the contents of 
the Decalogue, and that their authority is rooted ultimately in 
God. 
In fact, further research on the importance of natural law for the 
LL.B. curriculum would be a most welcome initiative for the South 
African context. It is unlikely that a separate and compulsory module 
on natural law will find space in the currently loaded LL.B. cur-
riculum.11 However, broadening or intensifying the prospects of 
such a topic within electives or within a subject such as legal philo-
sophy itself, will do much to remedy the situation.  
                                      
11 Hervada (2006:175-176) provides a valid argument as to why “natural law” 
should be a unique and autonomous module. 
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4. Conclusion 
In the contemporary debate on the role of the university in legal 
education, an overwhelming emphasis is placed on training and 
educating the student from a practical and positivistic point of view. 
This has implications for Christian law students at undergraduate 
level, who run the risk of being influenced by jurisprudential views 
that may come into confrontation with their foundational belief. Con-
sequently, a conceptual framework is postulated which could reme-
dy (or improve) this situation. In this regard it is argued that legal 
philosophy can be effectively utilised to convincingly argue for the 
accommodation and cultivation of the law student’s Christian con-
victions. When it comes to the teaching of legal philosophy, the risk 
of ideological bias is high. It is therefore hoped that the proposals 
provided in this investigation will assist in preventing an unbalanced 
and exclusive approach to the teaching of such a subject. More 
specifically, it is postulated that legal philosophy needs to be intro-
duced early on in the LL.B. curriculum, include substantial teaching 
on epistemological and pretheoretical jurisprudential aspects, ac-
commodate proper explanations regarding the concept of neutrality 
and its jurisprudential implications, include traditionally religious 
sources in a substatial way, to have a satisfactory element of ob-
jectivity and inclusiveness, be further developed by additional elec-
tives or programmes, and place more emphasis on the natural law 
aspect. The practical application of the said proposals, however, 
would require a concerted effort by the relevant Christian expertise 
and other potential role players to meet and further discuss the 
implementation and implications resulting from this article’s findings 
(which should not be viewed as exhaustive). Associations in higher 
education need to be established and saddled with a specific 
mandate towards furthering the goal of the nurturing and develop-
ment of the undergraduate law student’s foundational belief system.  
All of this would surely assist towards developing Mill’s view that the 
proper business of a university is not to tell us what we ought to 
believe, but to provide us with information and to help us to form our 
own beliefs in a manner worthy of intelligent beings who seek for 
truth (Marsden, 1994:413). This is even more urgent and relevant 
when considering that there is a Charter for Religious Rights and 
Freedoms soon to be finalised for the South African community, 
stating among other things that: “Every person has the right on a 
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voluntary basis to receive and provide religious education, training 
and instruction …”.12  
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